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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78A-4-103(j). This appeal arises from the Order on Objection to Judgment and
Amended Judgment entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington
County, Utah in the case of Melwn Bircoll and Janine Bircoll v. Southwest Marble &
Granite. Inc. 050501733.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES and STANDARDS OF REVIEW
FIRST ISSUE1: Whether the trial court appropriately acted within its discretion
when it awarded Appellants an award of attorney's fees which corresponded to the claims
actually prevailed upon by the Appellants at trial, but which was less than the total amount
requested by Appellants?
Standard of Review: The trial court has broad discretion in determining what
constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination against an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. (Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988)).
SECOND ISSUE: Whether the trial court's reduced award of attorney's fees is
against public policy or inequitable?

1

The Appellants in the instant case do not comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure in that the Brief of the Appellants does not contain the required
statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority; and citation to the record showing that the
issue was preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court. (XJRAP Rule 24(a)(5) 2009). Nevertheless, the
Appellee herein states the issues on appeal with the corresponding standards of review.

Standard of Review: The trial court has broad discretion in determining what
constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination against an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. (Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988).
STATUTORY PROVISION
The following is the statutory provision referenced in the present appeal:
UCA §38-1-18(1):
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled
to recover a reasonable attorneys fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the present case, Plaintiffs, Dr. Melvin Bircoll and Janine Bircoll (hereinafter
"Appellants") hired Southwest Marble & Granite, Inc (hereinafter "Appellee") to fabricate
and install counter-tops in their newly-constructed residence. (Record at 71,1J25). The
records and notes in the Appellee's project file indicated that the correct counter-tops were
installed in the residence of the Appellants. (Record at 74, ^|60). However, after the
installation, Appellants expressed dissatisfaction to employees of the Appellee with the
counter-tops installed in the master-bathroom. (Record at 72, ffi[34-35). The Appellants
alleged that these counter-tops were completely and entirely wrong; including the wrong
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thickness, the wrong color of the stone and the wrong edge of the countertops installed in
the master bathroom. (Record at 72 *jj43 of Findings).
The Appellee believed that the counter-tops were of the same color, thickness and
edge which had been ordered by the Appellants. The Appellee sent invoices for payment
to the Appellees in the amount of the contracted price of $2,182. (Record at 70, ^[20).
However, Appellants refused to pay anything to the Appellee for the master-bathroom
counter-tops. (Record at 72, ^[43). The Appellee asked Appellants if they were willing to
pay just $900.00 for the bathroom counter-tops; however, Appellants indicated that they
were not interested in paying $900.00 for the counter-tops. (Id.)
The Appellants conveyed the message to the Appellee that "the countertops were of
no value to them and that the Bircolls [Appellants] intended to initiate a lawsuit against
Southwest Marble [Appellee] for these countertops. (Record at 74, ^[60). Appellants
threatened litigation and demanded "that the invoice be written down to zero" which gave
the Appellee the impression that Appellants did not have any willingness to discuss this
matter and that they were unwilling for any result except a total reduction of the billing.
However, from the project file, it appeared that the countertops installed were according to
the specifications of color, edge and thickness." (Record at 74, ^[60 of Findings).
Subsequently, in an effort to protect its lien rights and pursuant to UCA §38-1-7,
the Appellee timely filed a mechanic's lien upon Appellant's real property in the amount
of $2,182. (Record at 74 ^[62 of Findings). Thereafter, Appellants filed a complaint
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against Appellee in which they allege four (4) separate causes of action; namely. (1) Abuse
of Li em (2) Breach of Contract (3) Breach of Modification Agreement, and (4) Breach of
the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. (Record at 1-7). In response, Appellee filed its
Answer along with a counter-claim for (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Unjust Enrichment, and
(3) Foreclosure of Lien. (Record at 11-16).
After the bench trial had concluded, the Trial Court awarded the Appellants the
difference between the cost of a new countertop and the amount Appellants should have
paid for the countertop installed, two sinks, replacement of back-splash, plumbing work
and repainting for a total of $1,565.00. (Record at 76, f72 of Findings). The Trial Court
concluded that Appellee had not installed countertops of the wrong thickness. (Record at
77, ^6 of Conclusions). The Appellants did not prevail on their allegations that the
countertops were the wrong color of stone or edge. (Record at 132). The Trial Court
correctly noted that the Appellants had expended "a considerable amount of time and
energy" on the unsuccessful claim that the color of the stone was not "Juperana
Bordeaux." (Id).
The Trial Court concluded that the Appellants were excused from paying the
contracted price of $2,182 due to the countertops being the wrong thickness and
subsequently, Appellee was not entitled to maintain its mechanic's lien. (Record at 78, ffl[9
and 17). The Trial Court then concluded that the Appellants were entitled to an award of
attorney's fees to be determined at a later date. (Record at 79, ^f 20).
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The Trial Court issued a written opinion with supporting caselaw which concluded
that since the Appellants had not prevailed on three of their four causes of action (Abuse
of Lien, Breach of Modification Agreement and Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Faith
Dealings) that the Trial Court would not award entire amount of attorney's fees claimed by
the Appellants. (Record at 129-133). After considering the factors outlined in several
Utah cases, the Trial Court awarded the Appellants $1,565.00 in principal along with
$4?310.88 in attorney's fees and $369.00 in costs. (Record at 132).
Subsequently, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal and allege that the Trial
Court should have awarded them $17,243.50 in attorney's fees, being the total amount
claimed to be expended on all four of their causes of action. (Brief of Appellants at 2).
The Appellants allege on appeal that the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees is "against
public policy" and "inequitable." (Id at 3-8).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On the 23rd of January, 2008, the parties came before the Trial Court for bench trial
on Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Complaint and Defendant's/Appellee's Counter-Claim.
(Record at 66-67).

2.

The total money judgment awarded in the favor of the Appellants on their Second
Cause of Action: Breach of Contract claim was $1,565.00 plus attorney's fees and
costs to be determined by the Trial Court. (Record at 76, J72).
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The Appellants did not prevail on three (3) of their four (4) causes of action.
(Record at 132).
On the 22nd of April, 2008, Appellee filed its Objection to Form and Content of
Proposed Order and Judgment. (Record at 83-90).
On the 28th of April, 2008, Appellants submitted a request for attorney's fees and
costs in the amount of $ 17,243.50 in the form of an Affidavit of Counsel and
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements. (Record at 91-95).
The Appellants did not separate out nor categorize the attorney's fees and costs
allegedly expended for the successful claim for which they may be entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees and the unsuccessful claims for which there would not
be an entitlement to attorney's fees. (Record at 131-132).
The amount of attorney's fees claimed by the Appellants was more than one
thousand one hundred percent (1100%) of the actual damages awarded by the Trial
Court. (Cf. Record at 76, f72 with Record 91-95).
That Trial Court concluded that since the Appellee did not prevail on its counterclaim for Breach of Contract, Appellee could not, therefore, maintain a lien for the
contract price against the real property of the Appellants. (Record at 80, ^ 21).
That while the Trial Court concluded that the Appellee could not maintain its lien,
the Trial Court specifically found and concluded that the lien was not an abusive
lien under UCA §38-1-25. (Id.)

10.

That the Trial Court specifically concluded that the Appellee had not caused the
lien to be filed with the "intent to cloud title/' or, ccto exact more than [Appellee]
believed was due, or to gain any unjustified advantage or benefit." (Id.)

11.

That the Trial Court also concluded that although the Appellants found the
countertops to be Cta disappointment", the Trial Court did not "find bad faith or an
improper purpose in [Appellee's] disagreement in valuation and its desire to be paid
for services and materials actually provided ... and ... "[Appellants'] claim for abuse
of lien right fails." (Record at 80,ffif22-23).

12.

On the 7th of May, 2008, the Order and Judgment was entered. (Record at 102-104).
However, the Court entered this Judgment under the mistaken belief that there was
not any Objection to Form of the proposed judgment filed by the Appellee. (Cf
Record 83-90). The Trial Court had been experiencing a heavy volume and
associated problems at this time period. (See e.g., Record at 148-150).

13.

On the 29th day of September, 2008, the final judgment entitled "Order on
Objection to Judgment and Amended Judgment", the subject matter of this appeal,
was entered which provides for a money judgment in favor of the Appellants for
$1,565.00 in damages plus $369.00 in costs and $4,310.88 in attorney's fees.
(Record at 129-134).

14.

On the 26th of January, 2009, an Order Granting Plaintiffs [Appellants'] Extension
to File Appeal was entered. (Record at 163-164).

7

15.

On the 9th of February, 2009, a Notice of Appeal was filed by the Appellants.
(Record at 165-166).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In the present case. Appellants prevailed on their breach of contract claim and the

court determined that since the Appellee had not prevailed on its breach of contract claim,
then the mechanic's lien could not be maintained nor foreclosed. (Record at 129-134).
Appellants made a claim for attorney's fees which exceeds the amount of recovery by
more than 1100%. In sum, the Appellants allege that they were obliged to logged one
hundred five (105) hours of attorney time, more than $17,243.50 in time and costs, over a
claim of only $2,182. Although the Appellants pursued three other claims, Abuse of Lien,
Breach of Modification of Agreement and Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, Appellants only prevailed in their Breach of [Oral] Contract claim.
In the post-trial proceedings, the Trial Court exercised it broad discretion in
fashioning an award of attorney's fees which it believed was appropriate and reasonable.
The adjudication of reasonableness should be upheld in this case since there was not any
abuse of discretion, violation of public policy or inequity.
Moreover, as a procedural matter on appeal, the Appellants fail to marshal the
evidence, fail to provide an adequate record to support their allegations on appeal, fail to
provide supporting legal authority, and fail to follow the proper documentation and format
of the briefing requirements. Appellants claim they because they are filing this brief pro
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se that they should be excused from compliance. It is interesting to note that on appeal
that Mr. Bircoll refers to himself as "Mel" when during the trial proceedings there was
immediate offense taken by the Appellants when Melvyn Bircoll was inadvertently
referred to as LCMr. Bircoll" instead of cT)r. Bircoll"; with the Appellants insisting on the
use of the latter title. It was apparent that the title was of importance to emphasize his
erudition and accomplishments. This does not appear to be the same posturing on appeal.
Additionally, during the appellate mediation program, the Appellants were represented by
their attorney daughter who acted as their representative to make their arguments with
referrence to specific caselaw.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT FAILS TO
COMPLY WITH THE FORM AND MARSHALING REQUIREMENTS.
Even though Appellants are pro se appellants, they must comply with the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, f4 (the pro se appellant failed
to follow the appellate rules, failed to identify flaws in the district court's order to be
reversed, did not provide portions of the record central to appeal, and failed to show that
there was not a reasonable basis in the record to support the district court's holdings)).
The Brief of the Appellants fails to identify flaws in the district court ruling, does not
provide citations to the record, fails to provide supporting legal authority, and fails to
demonstrate that there was not a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions of the
Trial Court.
9

The Brief of the Appellants fails to comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. (Utah R. App. P. 24). Appellants fail to provide standards of review
with supporting authority, citations to the record, constitutional provisions, statutes, and
rules whose interpretation is determinative on appeal, a table of authorities, and supporting
legal authority which supports the conclusions of the Appellants that the award of
attorneys fees was "against public policy" and "inequitable".
The Appellants have not taken issue with the findings of the Trial Court and have
failed to provide a transcript of the hearing held on Appellee's Objection to Form and
Content of Proposed Order and Judgment submitted by the Appellants. Therefore, it
should be assumed, as a matter of law, that the trial court's decision to award less than the
amount of attorney's fees requested by Appellants was not erroneous. (See, Jolivet v.
Cook. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033, 110 S.Ct 751, 107
L.Ed.2d 767 (1990) (court assumes regularity of proceedings below where appellant fails
to provide adequate record on appeal) (citing State v. Miller. 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah
1986); State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985); State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263,
1267 (Utah 1982)). See also, State v. Steggell 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983) (court
assumes correctness of judgment below if counsel on appeal fails to cite to record); State
v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982) (court assumes correctness of findings when
defendant's brief contained nothing more than defendant's version of facts found by trial
court). These failures in the briefing and marshaling requirements is sufficient to base a
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decision to decline to reach issues on appeal. (State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah
App. 1991); Trees v Lewis. 738 P.2d 612. 612-13 (Utah 1987)).
H.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
AWARDED LESS THAN THE FULL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS TO
APPELLANTS WHEN APPELLANTS FAILED TO PREVAIL ON THREE
OF THEIR FOUR CAUSES OF ACTION.
The trial court's award of attorney's fees was well within its discretion to award

less than the attorney's fees requested by the Appellants. In fact, the Appellants in their
brief acknowledge that the trial court holds the "discretion" to award attorney's fees.
(Appellants' Brief at 4). Under Utah law, there is not any precise formula which defines
"reasonable" as it applies to attorney's fees. The inquiry and determination of what
constitutes a reasonable award of attorney's fees depends upon a number of factors which
include the amount in controversy, the extent of services rendered and other factors which
the trial court is in an advantaged position to judge. (Wallace v. Build, 402 P.2d 699, 701
(1965); see also, Record at 130).
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that the party requesting attorney's fees
is required to categorize the time and fees expended for the successful claim for which
there may be an entitlement to reasonable attorney fees and the claims for which there is
no entitlement to attorneys fees. (See, Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, ^[50 and Foote
v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998)).
The Trial Court concluded that under UCA §38-1-18 a "reasonable" attorney's fee
should be awarded to the Appellants. (Record at 129). The Trial Court relied, in part, on
11

the premise that a "successful part}' includes one who successfully enforces or defends
against a lien action." (Id., citing to Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT App 335 ^[9). Trial courts
are afforded the discretion to take into account "the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of
hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar sendees, the
amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved." (Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983); see also, Record
at 130).
In this present case, the Appellee pursued what it believed to be a rightful collection
of an unpaid account owed by the Appellants. It was the refusal of the Appellants to pay
any portion of this billing related to the subject countertops that resulted in the filing of the
mechanic's lien and pursuit of collection. Appellee pursued in good faith what it believed
to be the amount due and owing; $2,182 from the Appellants. Appellants in this case did
prevail on their breach of contract claim and Appellee was not permitted to foreclose its
mechanic's lien. The Trial Court specifically concluded that there was not any abuse of
lien or wrongful lien recorded by the Appellee.
The Appellants claimed to have expended more than one hundred five hours (105) hours
in handling the fight over the $2,182 claim. Considering the criteria prescribed by the Utah
Supreme Court, this expenditure of attorneys fees is excessive. The individual time entries reflect
in inordinate amount of time expended. For example, at the tail-end of the road of litigation, there
is a claim that approximately twenty (20) hours, $3800.00 in attorneys fees, were spent in
12

preparation for the 6-hour bench trial. Then after all of the twenty (20) hours of preparation for
trial and the six (6) hours in trial, it took an additional eight point eight hours (8.8) hours, $1,672
in attorneys fees, to prepare the proposed findings of facts; compared with the two point one (2.1)
hours, $409.50 of fees expended by Appellee for the preparation of its proposed findings of fact.
However, by the time that a case is prepared for trial, as part of the trail preparation trial notes axe
made, the proposed findings that follow are merely a cleaning up and the editing of those trial
notes. This certainly did not necessarily require near nine (9) hours to complete. (Record at 87,
100).
The Appellants' Brief cites to only one legal authority; namely, Trayner v. Cushing, 688
P.2d 856 (Utah 1984). The Trial Court in the present case reviewed Trayner and noted in its
decision to reduce the attorney's fees requested that Trayner stands for the expansion of the list of
factors that a trial court should consider in fashioning an award of attorney's fees. (Record at 130).
Trayner identifies factors such as "the relationship of the fee to the amount recovered, the novelty
and difficulty of the issues involved, the overall result achieved and the necessity of initiating a
lawsuit to vindicate rights under the contract." (Trayner at 858; Record at 130). Moreover, the
Trayner court states that a party is "entitled only to those fees attributable to the successful
vindication of contractual rights within the terms of their agreement." (Id.)
In the instant case, the Trial Court considered the factors espoused by the applicable
caselaw in exercising its discretion to fashion an attorney's fees award which was reasonable
under the circumstances and related to the claims on which Appellants actually prevailed; and not
related to those claims on which Appellants failed. (Record 129-133). The Trial Court did not
believe that there was any particular novelty or unusual difficulty involved in the present case. (Id
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at 131). The Trial Court expressed that it has "serious reservations about the great disparity in the
relationship of the fee [requested] to the amount recovered [by the Appellants]... and about the
allocation of fees among those causes of action for which an attorney's fee is recoverable and
those for which it is not/5 (Id).
The Trial Court correctly agreed with the Appellee that Utah law requires that the trial
courts should allocate the prevailing party's attorney's fees among those claims for which it is
entitled to an award of attorney's fees and those for which it is not. (Record at 85 and 131; see
also, Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353, T}46, 144 P.3d 261;
Stonecreek Landscaping, LLC v. Bell 2008 UT App 144 (unpublished)(noting the trial court
could have chosen not to award any fees when a party fails to separate its fees between matters on
which it was successful and unsuccessful). In the present case, the Trial Court found that the
Appellants failed to "differentiate between work done on the compensable mechanic's lien claim
and the non-compensable abusive lien and contract-related claims." (Record at 131). The Trial
Court held that it was neither reasonable nor equitable to require the Appellee to absorb much of
the cost associated with certain portions of the litigation. (Record at 132).
III.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF FAILS TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATIONS THAT
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND/OR
INEQUITABLE.
Appellants provide mere opinions without any supporting legal authority.

Appellants argue that the failure to award them all of their attorney's fees, despite the fact
that they failed to prevail on all of their causes of action, because it "denies litigants their
right to trial." (Appellants' Brief at 3). However, that statement is entirely unsupported
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with legal authority. There is not any evidence or legal authority to support the
proposition that the Appellants have been "punished" or denied "their right to trial55.
There is not any evidence to support the argument that the Appellants have been denied
any due process, access to the courts or have been "punished55.
Appellants also argue that the present case "encourages reckless lien practices.55
(Appellants5 Brief at 4). However, there is nothing cited by Appellants to support this
argument. It is noteworthy that Appellants failed to prevail on their abuse of lien cause of
action. (Record at 131). The Trial Court specifically found that the lien was not abusive
under UCA §38-1-25 and that the Appellee did not cause the lien to be filed with the intent
to cloud title, to exact more than it believed was due, or to get any unjustified advantage or
benefit. (Record at 80, ^21).
Appellants then argue that the award of attorney's fees in the present case was
"inequitable." (Appellants5 Brief at 4). It is understandable and anticipated that most, if not all,
litigants who do not prevail on all of their causes of action are likely to feel that the judgment of
the trial court was inequitable. However, there is nothing in the present case on appeal to support
the claim of an inequitable remedy. Appellants argue that they had "no choice but litigate". (Id at
5). However, this is not accurate. This case was over the small amount of $2,182. (Record at
15). The Appellee's project file indicated that the countertops which had been ordered by
Appellants, had been installed. (Record at 74, ^|61). The Trial Court found that the Appellee had
offered to resolve the disputed amount with a payment of $900; however, Appellants responded
by demanding the account be reduced to zero dollars and threatened to litigate. (Record at 72,
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^[42-43, 61). It was the Appellants who elected to take formal depositions and spend 105 hours
of attorney time. (Record 87: 97-101).
Appellants litigated the case under the premise that they were going to ultimately prevail
on their abuse of lien cause of action and thereby stood to gain the entire amount of attorney's
fees, costs and statutoiy damages. Nevertheless, it was the Appellee who successfully defended
against the abuse of lien cause of action. (Record at 131).
CONCLUSION
The Appellants did not prevail at trial on their abuse of lien claims. The Appellants
were awarded attorney's fees on their prevailing defense against the foreclosure of the
lien. The Trial Court considered the important and relevant factors in fashioning the
attorney's fees award and acted well within its discretion in adjudicating the award of
attorney's fees based upon the specific circumstances of the present case. Appellee is a bit
troubled by the formula applied by the Trial Court in fashioning the attorney's fee award;
namely, awarding one-fourth of the fees based upon the fact that Appellants prevailed on
one of their four causes of action. Nevertheless, it does not appear that the Trial Court
abused its discretion in its application of the factors to be considered under Utah law with
respect to the award of attorney's fees.
The arguments of the Appellants are based upon mere opinion of Dr. Bircoll that
the Trial Court acted inequitably, that the Appellants were denied access to the courts, and
that the judgment was against public policy. The Appellants' positions on appeal lack
legal authority and persuasive argument.
16

For the foregoing reasons, the Appellee respectfully requests that the Appellants'
brief be dismissed or in the alternative, that the Order on Objection to Judgment and
Amended Judgment entered by the Trial Court be affirmed.
Dated this 3rd day of September, 2009.
Respectfully Submitted,
Fams^rtftfeYvBrl

Shawn T. Farris
Attorne>nR^r1[5efendant/Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that on the 3rd day of September, 2009, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was duly served by depositing in the
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, first-class mail and addressed as follows:
Melvyn Bircoll & Janine Bircoll
2700 Casiano Road
Los Angeles, CA 90077

An Em^uj^eejyf Farris & Utley, PC
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MELVYN BLRCOLL and JANLNE
BIRCOLL, individuals,

| ORDER ON OBJECTION TO JUDGMENT
' AND AMENDED JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 050501733
SOUTHWEST MARBLE & GRANITE,
INC, a Utah corporation, et al.,
Judge Eric A. Ludlow
Defendants.

Defendant Southwest Marble & Granite, Inc. has propounded an objection to the form
and the content of the order and judgment previously entered. On August 14, 2008, the Court
held a hearing on the objection, at which plaintiffs were represented by Michael F. Leavitt and
defendant was represented by Shawn T. Farris. Having considered the objection, the
memoranda, the arguments of counsel, and the affidavit in support of the attorney's fee, the Court
finds the fee award should be reduced for the reasons set forth below.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, "in any action brought to enforce any lien under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' [sic] fee, to be
fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." (Emphasis added). Naturally, the
right to an attorney's fee applies as much to one who demonstrates a lien's invalidity as to one
who shows its validity: "A successful party includes one who successfully enforces or defends
against a lien action." Kurih v Wiarda, 1999 UT App 335, P9 (Utah Ct App 1999), citing

Reeves v. Sieinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Uiah Ci. App. 1996) andPa/omm v £> & CBuilders,
22 Utah 2d 297, 300-01, 452 P.2d 325, 327-28 (1969).
No precise formula defines a "reasonable" artorney's fee; the inquiry is somewhat flexible
and is generally fact-specific, "What is reasonable depends upon a number of factors, the
amount in controversy, the extent of services rendered and other factors which the trial court is in
an advantaged position to judge.5" Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401. 405, 402 P.2d 699,
701 (1965). In Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that a calculation of attorney's fees should take into account "the difficulty of the
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number
of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the
amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved." In Trayner v. Gushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), the Court expanded the
list of factors to some extent, including "the relationship of the fee to the amount recovered, the
novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the overall result achieved and the necessity of
initiating a lawsuit to vindicate the [plaintiffs] rights," Id, at 858 (citing Turtle Management, .
Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)). Finally, in Dixie State Bank
v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah 1988), the Court also noted that certain elements drawn
from the Code of Professional Conduct, now the Rules of Professional Responsibility, may
inform the calculus. Of the professional responsibility factors the Bracken court mentioned, this
Court finds the second listed, the question of cc[h]ow much of the work performed was
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter," id, to be especially pertinent.
The Court does not believe that there is any serious dispute that the hourly rate plaintiffs'
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counsel has charged is reasonable m ihis locahiy Additionally Mr Leavin is an experienced
attorney and has asserted his clients rights ably and diligently Tne Court does not, however,
believe there was any particular no\ elty or unusual difficulty involved in this case, and it has
some serious reservations about the great disparity in "the relationship of the fee to the amount
recovered," Trayner, 688 P 2d at 858, and about the allocation of fees among those causes of
action for which an attorney's fee is recoverable and those for which it is not
The complaint listed four causes of action, mcludmg the two hen claims for which
attorney's fees were statutorily recoverable Ultimately, the Court determined that plaintiffs did
not prove an abusive lien and only awarded attorney fees on the mechanic's hen claim cTt is
clear that Utah law requires the prevailing party, and ultimately the court, to allocate the
prevailing party's attorney fees among those claims for which it is entitled to an award of
attorney fees and those for which it is not " Ellsworth Paulsen Constr Co v 51- SPR, LLC, 2006
UT App 353, If 46, 144 P 3d 261 See also Stonecreek Landscaping, LLC v Bell, 2008 UT App
144 (unpublished), in which the Court of Appeals noted a party's "failure to separate its fees
between matters on which it was successful and unsuccessful," id at *8, and stated, "[i]n the
absence of that detailed information, the trial court could have chosen not to award fees at all,"
id

Here, the affidavit and breakdown of fees provided by counsel does not differentiate
between the work done on the compensable mechanic's hen claim and the non-compensable
abusive lien and contract-related claims The Court has examined counsel's billing statement
and finds a relative absence of helpful subject-matter labels consequently, the Court is unable to
determine with precision which fees belong to which claim In such cases, the appellate courts
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have found that an award of a portion of a party's '"actual attorney fees [] corresponding to the
relative overall extent of its success, [is] reasonable." i#.
The Court dislikes second-^uessin^ the strategic decisions of counsel and understands
that plaintiffs could (and do) see the abusive hen issue differently than the Court. It also notes
that there is some overlap among recoverable and non-recoverable claims. It is, however, neither
reasonable nor equitable to require Southwest to absorb so much of the cost associated with
certain portions of the litigation. The Court must also take note of the fact that a considerable
amount of time and energy was spent on an issue- the "Juperana Bordeaux" question- that was
ultimately decided against plaintiffs. Given this fact, plus the disparity in the fees claimed and
the principal recovery, the failure of the affidavit to specify the time spent on the successful
mechanic's lien matter, and the fact that plaintiffs have shown an entitlement to attorney's fees
for just one of the four causes of action listed in the complaint, the Court will reduce the fees to
one-fourth of what plaintiffs have requested. The Court finds that 26.35 hours is a fair and
reasonable amount of time to have spent on the mechanic's lien claim and an award for that time
adequately vindicates plaintiffs rights under the statute.
JUDGMENT
In light of these findings, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
Plaintiffs have judgment against Defendant Southwest Marble & Granite, Inc. as follows:
$1,565.00
369.00
4,310.88
S 6244.88

Principal
Accrued costs to date of judgment
Attorney's fees to date of judgment
TOTAL J U D G M E N T
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This judgment includes interest at the judgment rate of 5 -2% per annum from the date of
this judgment until paid, plus any after-accruing costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or
otherwise as shall be established by affidavit
DATED this

^

day of

J

^

Judge Eric A. Ludlow
Fifth District Court
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on this

U

day of

rV^^

, 2008,1 provided a true and

correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON OBJECTION TO JUDGMENT AND AMENDED
JUDGMENT to each of the parties/attorneys named below by placing a copy in such attorney's
file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a
copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:

Michael F. Leavitt
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C.
192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St. George, Utah 84770
Shawn Farris
Farris & Utley, P.C.
2107 West Sunset Blvd., 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 2408
St. George, Utah 84770
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MELVYN and JANINE BJRCOLL,
individuals,
!
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendants,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

SOUTHWEST MARBLE & GRANITE, INC.,
a Utah corporation; and JOHN DOES LX;

Civil No. 050501733
Judge Eric A. Ludlow

Defendant/Counterclaimani

The above-captioned parties appeared before this Court on the 23rd day of January, 2008
for a trial in this matter. Plaintiffs, Melvyn and Janine Bircoll, were represented by Michael F.
Leavitt of the law firm Durham Jones & Pinegar, P C. Defendant, Southwest Marble & Granite,
Inc., was represented by Shawn Farris of the law firm of Farris & Utley, P.C. The Court heard
the testimony of witnesses and viewed the evidence in this matter. Based thereon, the Court
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following findings of fact:
1. Plaintiffs are the owners of real property located at 110 Gilford Park, Springdale, Utah
("Property").

2. Defendant is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business located in
Washington County, State of Utah.
3. Beginning in 2004, Plaintiffs began the process of constructing a custom home on the
Property.
4. Upon recommendation of their builder, Steven Roth, Plaintiff approached Defendant
for the purchase of countertops in the new home.
5. Plaintiff also approached Defendant's sister operation, Southwest Tile, for the
purchase of tiles for the new home.
6. In or about December 2004 or January 2005, Plaintiff first approached Defendant
concerning the purchase of granite countertops for both the kitchen and the master bathroom in
the home.
7. Defendant was represented by a person named Mark Burnett who represented that he
specialized in selling granite countertops.
8. Plaintiffs informed Defendant that the home they were building was a custom-built
home and that they had specific designs for the home because of its location near Zion National
Park.
9. Defendant showed Plaintiffs a number of different samples of types of granite and
verbally provided Plaintiffs with prices per square foot for three or four different types.
10. Defendant did not provide any prices in writing to Plaintiffs.
11. Defendant showed Plaintiffs a sample of a specific type of granite that Defendant
indicated was called ccJuperana Bordeaux.'5
12. This sample was well more than 1 Vi inches thick.
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13. Plaintiffs were extremely fond of this granite because the coloring, including the
veining and crystallization, matched the surrounding landscape and fit in well with the design of
the home. Defendant explained that there would be variations this granite, as there is in any
natural stone.
14. Plaintiffs selected this granite for both the kitchen and the master bathroom.
15. Plaintiffs had considered going with the thicker granite, but because of costs
ultimately selected a thickness of 1 lA inches.
16. Defendant reiterated to Plaintiffs that the granite they had selected would not be as
thick as the sample, but would only be 1 lA inches thick.
17. When Plaintiffs selected this granite, they specified to Defendant that they wanted
the granite to be the same in both the kitchen and bathroom, specifically, that both countertops
would be of the same color of granite as the sample they had been shown, and the same
thickness, to wit; 1 A inches thick.
IS. The only difference between the kitchen and bathroom countertops was that the
kitchen was to have a chipped or "rustic" edge and the bathroom was to have a lA inch beveled
edge.
19. Defendant verbally confirmed these specifications to Plaintiffs.
20. Defendant verbally informed Plaintiffs of the cost for installation of this granite in
their home, which total costs were $4,685.00 for the kitchen countertop and $2,182.00 for the
bathroom countertops.
21. Plaintiffs requested written cost estimates from Defendant
22. Defendant never provided them.
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23 Plaintiffs requested that Defendant provide them with a written contract,
memorializing the cost of the countertops and other terms of the agreement between the panics.
24. Defendant never provided any written contract or agreement or a writing evidencing
the terms of their agreement.
25. Between March 2005 and end of May 2005, Defendant installed countertops in
Plaintiffs5 home.
26. Plaintiffs were not home at the time the countertops were installed, but were out of
the area.
27. On the day before the countertops were installed, Defendant had a telephone
conversation with Plaintiffs in which Defendant stated that the kitchen countertops looked good
"with that beveled edge."
28. Plaintiffs corrected Defendant, informing it that the edge in the kitchen was to have a
chipped or "rustic" look.
29. Defendant acknowledged that a mistake had been made and informed Plaintiffs that
the cotmtertop could still be chipped.
30. Plaintiffs first arrived back home, viewing the installed countertops for the first time,
at the end of May 2005 or beginning of June 2005.
31. Plaintiffs first viewed the kitchen, where they noticed a number of problems,
including: (1) the countertop was now shorter because Defendant had to chip the edge, reducing
the edge by approximately V2 inch to 1 inch; (2) cabinets had been damaged in the installation;
and (3) there were missing grease traps that should have been installed.
32. In spite of these problems, Plaintiffs were generally satisfied with the appearance of
the kitchen countertop, particularly with its color.
4

33 The coloring of the kitchen countertop was similar 10 the sample Defendant had
shown them, was 1 lA inches thick, and had a chipped edge
34. Plaintiffs then viewed the bathroom countertops.
35. Immediately, Plaintiffs noted that the bathroom countertops were not what they had
ordered.
36. First, the color of the bathroom countertop was different from that m the kitchen,
containing more brown coloring than burgundy and salmon and containing no crystallization in
the stone, as had the color in the kitchen.
37. Second, the countertops in the bathroom were only 3A inch thick.
38. Third, the countertops had a flat, polished edge.
39. Plaintiffs immediately called Defendant to report the problem.
40. Mark Burnett, on behalf of Defendant, came to Plaintiffs' home within a week of the
telephone call to look at the countertops.
41. Upon arrival, Defendant acknowledged that the countertops were not as Plaintiffs
had requested, stating that the countertop appeared to be a "Juperana Brown."
42 Defendant asked Plaintiffs if they would be willing to pay just $900.00 for the
bathroom countertops.
43. Plaintiffs indicated that they were not interested in paying $900 for these
countertops, expressing to Defendant that, because of the wrong color, thickness and edge, the
appearance of the countertops actually detracted from the room.
44. Defendant then expressed concern over the cost of replacing the countertops, noting
that the plumbing had already been installed and that the sinks and tile backsplash might be
damaged in the removal process.
5

45. At that point, Defendant suggested that the Plaintiffs take the bathroom couniertops
free of charge, stating that the cost to replace would be far more expensive.
46. Defendant stated that he would need to clear it with "the owner," but assured
Plaintiffs that it should be u no problem."
47. Though they were not interested in keeping the countertops in the bathroom,
Plaintiffs expressed a willingness to accept this compromise, being in the process or moving into
their new home.
48. Plaintiffs even told Defendant that, when they chose to replace the countertops, they
would use Defendant and pay full price for the new countertops.
49. At that time, Plaintiffs provided Defendant with their credit card number to pay for
the kitchen countertops and assumed all was resolved.
50. Approximately a week later, Plaintiffs spoke with Mark Burnett, who informed them
that the owner had cleared the arrangement they had made. In fact, Mr. Burnett did not
communicate with Mr. Eggertz concerning his discussion with the Bircolls and their claims that
the countertops were wrong.
51. At some time after this discussion with Mr. Burnett, his employment with Defendant
was terminated based upon his poor performance and not meeting customers' expectations.
52. Toward the end of June 2005, Plaintiffs received a bill from Defendant showing that
Plaintiffs still owed Defendant $4,685.00 for the kitchen countertop and $2,182.00 for the
bathroom countertops.
53. Plaintiffs called Defendant and spoke with a person named ccMargaref' who
identified herself as the head of accounting.
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54 Plaintiffs informed Margaret what had transpired between Plaintiffs and Mi Burnett
and specifically told her about the arrangement that Mr Burnett had made with them
55 Plaintiffs gave Margaret their credit card number again for the kitchen countertop
56 Margaret informed Plaintiffs that she would take care of it
57 Margaret did not inform Plaintiffs that Mr Burnett's employment with Defendant
had been terminated In fact, Plaintiffs did not learn of this fact until after a Notice of
Mechanics' Lien was recorded against their property in late July 2005
58 Later, Plaintiffs received another bill from Defendant for the bathroom countertop
59 Plaintiffs agam called Defendant and spoke with Margaret, who, again, informed
them that it would be taken care of
60 Mr Bircoll left a telephone message for Mr Eggertz that the countertops were of no
value to them and that the Bircolls intended to initiate a lawsuit against Southwest Marble for
these countertops
61 Given the telephone message and letter from Mr Bircoll, along with the threat of
litigation and demands that the mvoice be written down to zero, Mr Eggertz had the impression
that Plaintiffs did not have any willingness to discuss this matter and that they were unwilling for
any result except a total reduction of the billmg However, from the project file, it appeared that
the countertops installed were accordmg to the specifications of color, edge and thickness
62 On or about July 27 2005, Defendant caused a Notice of Mechanics' Lien to be filed
against the Property, claiming that Plaintiffs owed Defendant $2,182 00 for improvements to the
Property
63 Defendant never mailed a copy of the Notice of Mechanics' Lien to Plaintiffs via
certified mad, or personally deLvered a copj7 to Plaintiffs
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64. Loren Valdez, general manager of Defendant called Plaintiffs and verbally informed
them that Defendant had placed a mechanics' lien on Plaintiffs' home for their failure to pay the
amount requested for the bathroom countertops.
65. Plaintiffs informed Mr. Valdez of the problem with the bathroom countertops and
the arrangement that they had made with Mr. Burnett.
66. Mr. Valdez expressed sympathy for Plaintiffs5 position, but stated that there was
nothing he could do and that the owner, Jeff Eggertz, was the only party who could make the
final decision with respect to their situation.
67. Plaintiffs requested that Mr, Valdez relay Plaintiffs' position to Mr. Eggertz and that
Mr. Eggertz either call him or come to the house to look at the countertops and discuss the
matter.
68. Plaintiffs had three or four additional conversations with Mr. Valdez with similar
discussions.
69. In spite of Plaintiffs' requests, Mr. Eggertz never attempted to speak directly with
Plaintiffs concerning this matter until well after the litigation had commenced.
70. On the last conversation Plaintiffs had with Mr. Valdez, Mr. Valdez confirmed that
he had spoken with Mr. Eggertz and relayed all of Plaintiffs' concerns.
71. Mr. Valdez informed Plaintiffs that Mr. Eggertz had told Mr. Valdez that Plaintiffs
would either hear from Mr. Eggertz or hear from his attorney.
72. The costs of Plaintiffs to remove and replace the countertops are as follows:

a. Difference between the cost of a new
countertop (£2,372.00) and the amount
8

^

Qn

m

Plamuffs should have paid for the
countenop installed by Defendant
($2,182 00),

b Two (2) new sinks

^600

c Replacement of tile backsplash

m^n 00

d Five (5) hours for plumbing hook up and

<n?5 00

0Q

travel to Spnngdale by plumber

e Repaint around tile backsplash

<R?O0

TOTAL

$1,565 00

73 Experts for both Plaintiffs and Defendant acknowledged that the countertops m the
bathroom were 3A inch and had a flat, polished edge
74 Experts for both Plaintiffs and Defendant acknowledged that the countertops in both
the kitchen and bathroom could be classified as Juperana Bordeaux
75 Expert for Plaintiff explained, however, that because the two countertops are of a
differing thickness, the color variation exceeds the normal "natural7' variation because the two
countertops of differing thickness would, normally, not be cut fiom the same slab or material
76 According to Plaintiffs' expert, had the countertops been of the same thickness, it is
likely that they would have had a more similar color because they likely would have been cut
from the same slab or material
77 Defendant's expert did not refute this testimony
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As earl} as June 2005, Defendant Vvas aware that Plaintiffs had a concern over "he

installation of the countertops
79 Despite their dissatisfaction vath the bathroom countertops, Plaintiffs have used and
retained them m their home
CONCLUSIONS OF L A W
Based upon the foiegomg findings of fact, the Court makes the following conclusions of
law
1 Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiff agreed to pay
$2,182 00 for countertops to be placed in the Plaintiffs' bathroom at their new home on the
Property
2 As part of that agreement, Defendant agreed to install countertops m the bathroom
that were 1 !4 inches thick with a beveled edge
3 Defendant agreed that the countertop would be of a color designated as " Juperana
Bordeaux "
4 Defendant agreed that, with the exception of the edging, the bathroom countertops
would be the same as those installed in the kitchen, including color and thickness
5 Adequate consideration for this exchange of promises occurred
6 Defendant failed to perform pursuant to the terms of this agreement because it
installed countertops in the bathroom that were 3A inch thick with a flat, polished edge
7 Defendant failed to perform because, had the kitchen countertop and the bathroom
countertop both been 1 VA inches thick, the color of each would have been more similar and not
had the extreme variation that Plaintiffs found between the kitchen and the bathroom
8 Plaintiffs gave Defendant multiple opportunities to cure this failure
10

9 Defendant did not cure this failure after these opportunities were pro\ ided
10 As a result of Defendant's failure to install the correct countenops m the bathroom
and failure to cure, Defendant breached the agreement and Plaintiffs were excused from paying
Defendant the amount it claimed it was owed to wit $2,182 00
11 Defendant caused a Notice of Mechanics' Lien to be filed against the Property
12 With respect to mechanics' liens, Utah Code Arm §38-1-3 states
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any
services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used
m the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or
structure or improvement to any premises m any manner and
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of
cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service,
performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for
the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the
instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise except as the hen is
barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence Lien Restriction
and Lien Recovery Fund Act This hen shall attach only to such
interest as the ownei may have in the property

(Emphasis added)
13 In the instant case, the work performed by Defendant, with respect to the bathroom
countertops, was not entirely "at the mstance of the owner or any other person acting by his
authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise 3 ' because the work Defendant performed was not the
work that Plaintiffs requested
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Furthermore, because Defenaant installed the incorrect countertops, the ^ alue of

Defendant s services to Plaintiffs is not $2 182 00 as stated m the mechanics' lien, but Plaintiffs
will actually have to incur additional costs if ihey desire to replace the incorrect countertops
15 As a result, Defendant wras not entitled to record a mechanics' hen against the
Property
16 Utah Code Ann §38-1-18 states
Except as provided m Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action
brought to enforce any hen under this chapter the successful party shall be
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which
shall be taxed as costs in the action
17 Defendant is not the prevailing party in this matter with respect to its mechanics' hen
claim because Defendant was not entitled to record the hen as it did "A successful party
includes one who successfully enforces or defends against a hen action " Kurth v Wiaida, 1999
UT App 335, TJ 9 (Utah Ct App 1999)
18 Defendant is also not entitled to attorneys 5 fees because it failed to deliver, or mail
by certified mail, a copy of the mechanics' hen to Plaintiffs within 30 days of the date of filing
the notice of lien, as is required under Utah Code §38-1-7(3)
19 Plamtiffs are the prevailing party m this matter because Plaintiffs successfully
showed the Court that they do not owe Defendant $2,182 00 for the bathroom countertops and
that Defendant was not entitled to a mechanics 5 hen against the Property
20 As a result, Plaintiffs are entitled to an awrard of attorneys fees in an amount to be
determined b) affidavit or motion subsequent to these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and an order reflecting the same
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21 Howc\ er, while the Court finds the lien to be invalid it does not find it to have been
abusive under § 38-1-25 Defendant did not cause the lien to be filed with the "intent to cloud
the title/' id at (l)(a), to exact more than it believed was due, id at (b), or to get any "unjustified
advantage or benefit/ 5 id at (c)
22 As the Court of Appeals observed in EllsM>orth Paulsen Constr Co v 51-SPR,
LLC,

2006 UT App 353, n 14, the purpose of the abusive lien statute is cccto discourage

outrageous lien claims/ 5 and 'abuse of the hen process by creatmg a strong disincentive for a
would-be litigant to wrongly inflict a mechanic's hen on a property owner whose property was
not actually enhanced/ without chilling a legitimate hen claimant's right to file a mechanic's
hen for any amount that may be due 55 (Citations omitted) What constitutes an "enhancement75
to property may be, to a certain extent, m the eye of the beholder In this case, the Court
understands that Plaintiffs found the alleged "Juperana Bordeaux' 5 bathroom countertops to be a
disappointment and, overall, a detriment However, it cannot find bad faith or an improper
purpose m Defendant's disagreement in valuation and its desire to be paid for sendees and
materials actually provided.
23 Noting that the statute has potential criminal penalties and therefore specific state-ofmrnd requirements, the Ellsworth Paulsen court also pomted out, "lien claimants need to be
wary of using the mechanic's lien process to intentionally, knowmgly, or recklessly seek more
than they are due, or to push some othei abusive advantage But where a lien proves to have
been overstated for some other reason that does not violate the abusive lien statute, claimants
need not fear the criminal liability or civil penalties the statute imposes

55

Id Here, in retrospect,

it is clear Defendant should have communicated better with its customers and its own
employees It should probably have addressed Plaintiffs concerns more effectively and
13

tactfully It also should have comphed with ihe requirements of the mechanics' hen siaruie more
carefully These lapses however, fall short of establishing an abusive hen Therefore,
Plaintiffs' claim for abuse of the hen right fails
24 Counsel for plaintiff shall submit an order for judgment consistent with the foregoing
findings and conclusions

DATED THIS

1'iTV\

'_ day of April, 2008

Judge Eric A Ludlow
District Court Judge
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I hereby certify that on this

0

day of
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and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to
each of the parties/attorneys named below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's
Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St George, Utah and/or by placing a copy m the United
States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:

Michael F Leavitt
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C.
192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St. George, Utah 84770
Shawn Farris
Farris & Utley, P.C.
2107 West Sunset Blvd., 2nd Floor
PO. Box 2408
St. George, Utah 84770
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Shawn T Fams ; #7194
Fams & Uiley, P C.
2107 W. Sunset Blvd, Second Floor
St. George UT 84770
Telephone: (435) 634-1600
Fax: (435)628-9323
Attorneys for Southwest Marble & Granite, Inc
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MELVYN BIRCOLL and JANINE BIRCOLL,
individuals,

OBJECTION TO FORM AND CONTENT
OF PROPOSED ORDER AND
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
(Hearing Requested)
vs.
SOUTHWEST MARBLE & GRANITE, INC, a
Utah corporation, and JOHN DOES I-X,

Case No. 050501733
Judge Eric A. Ludlow

Defendants.
SOUTHWEST MARBLE & GRANITE, INC, a
Utah corporation,
Counter-Claimant,
vs.
MELVYN BIRCOLL and JANINE BIRCOLL,
Counter-Defendants,
Counter-Claimant Southwest Marble & Granite, Inc, by and through its counsel of record,
hereby files an Objection to the Form and Content of the Order and Judgment proposed by the
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants.
REQUEST FOR HEARING
A hearing is hereby requested in this matter. The length of the hearing is estimated to be
1

about 1 hour.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On the 23rd of January, 2008, this matter came before this Court for bench trial on Plaintiff s
Complaint and Defendant's Counter-Claim.

2.

The money judgment awarded in the favor of the Plaintiffs was $1,565.00.

3.

On or about the 15th of April, 2008, Plaintiffs submitted a request for attorney's fees and
costs in the amount of $17,243.50.

4.

Plaintiffs do not separate out and categorize the fees and costs allegedly expended for the
successful claim for which they may be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and
unsuccessful claims for which there would not be an entitlement to attorney's fees as is
required by the Utah Supreme Court.

5.

The amount of attorney's fees claimed by the Plaintiffs are more than 1100% of the actual
damages awarded.
ARGUMENT

I.

Categorization of Attorneys Fees.
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that the party requesting attorney's fees is

required to categorize the time and fees expended for the successful claim for which there may be
an entitlement to reasonable attorney fees and the claims for which there is no entitlement to
attorneys fees. (See, Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, ^[50 and Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54
(Utah 1998)).
This Court determined that the Defendant had installed the incorrect countertops and

therefore the value of Defendant s se^\ ices ~o Plain* fcs is not $2 182 00 as stated m the
mechanic s lien This Court determined that the costs of replacement would be SI 565 00 and
awarded the same m the form of a money judgment against the Defendant Additionally, this
Court found that because Defendant had installed the incorrect countertops m the masterbathroom the Defendant was not entitled to record a mechanic's lien agamst the Property This
Court then cites to UCA §38-11-107 which permits the recovery of "a reasonable attorney fee, to
be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action
Subsection 107 specifically limits the attorneys fee to the prevailing party in defending
against a mechanic's hen However, the Plaintiffs m this case sought other claims and causes of
action to which they did not prevail at trial Utah law requires that Plaintiffs separate and
categorize their attorneys fees and costs, which they have not done In the case of Moore v
Smith, 2007 UT App 101, the prevailing party sought $123,639 m attorneys fees The distnet
court found that the prevailing party was seeking attorneys fees for which they were not entitled
The trial court requested that the prevailing party resubmit a categorization of attorneys fees
claimed However, the prevailing party made only minor modifications
H

The Attorneys Fees Claimed by Plaintiffs are Excessive
The calculation of attorney fees is to be limited to reasonable attorneys fees (UCA §38-

11-107) The attorneys fees claimed should be carefully evaluated to make certain that the
ultimate amount awarded is consistent with the unique factors of this case and that these fees
adhere to the guidelines and criteria prescribed by Utah law
In the Moore case, the Appellate Court noted that the requested attorneys fees were "more
than four times the monetary award given the Plaintiff

and substantially more than the

$83 000 00 total purchase price for the subject home [which vas the subject matter of the
litigation] ' However m the present case, the claim for attorneys fees is even more excessive
The attorneys fees sought by the Plaintiffs are 1100% more thar the actual monetary award for
them as the Plaintiffs
III

The Attorneys Fees Claimed by Plaintiffs are Excessive when Compared
The Plaintiffs and the Defendant were both facing similar fronts The Plaintiffs had filed

a complaint which alleged four separate causes of action The Defendant defended against these
causes of action Likewise, Plaintiffs defended against the couni er-claim filed by the Defendant
The Plaintiffs did not prevail on their Abuse of Lien This Court specifically found that
the Defendant had not acted with the required malice and malicious intent The Defendant was
merely asserting a claim for what it believed was due under the contract since the project file was
consistent with the actual countertops installed in Plaintiffs7 Home And ultimately, this Court
determined that there was not any thing to this case other than a breach of contract cause of
action
The actual attorneys fees in costs incurred by the Defendant Southwest Marble through
trial is equal to approximately one-third (1/3) of the total attorneys fees claimed by the Plaintiffs
This was a case where there was a belief that the case would prevail on an abuse of hen theory
and therefore provide for an award of attorneys fees in favor of the Plaintiff
"When approaching litigation, it is important for both the parties and their respective
counsel to incur only those fees which would be reasonably incurred and necessary to promote
the reasonable positions of the parties The expenditure of 1100% more m fees than value of the
of the actual dispute is unreasonable and therefore any award of attorneys fees should be

A

significantly reduced (E g Moore ^ Smith cued aoo"\ e the trial court reduced ihe amount of
fees claimed by the prevailing party from S123 639 to $^0 000)
The Plaintiffs claim to have expended more than one hundred five hours (105) hours in
handling the fight over the $2,182 00 claim Considering the criteria prescribed by the Utah
Supreme Court, this expenditure of attorneys fees is excessive The individual time entries
reflect m inordinate amount of time expended For example, at the tail-end of the road of
litigation, there is a claim that approximately 20 hours, $3800 00 in attorneys fees, were spent m
preparation for the 6-hour bench trial Then after all of the 20 hours of preparation for trial and
the 6 hours in trial, it took an additional 8 8 hours, $ 1,672 in attorneys fees, to prepare the
proposed findings of facts Compared with the 2 1 hours, $409 50 of fees, expended by
Southwest Marble for the preparation of its proposed findings of fact However, by the time that a
case is prepared for trial, as part of the trail preparation trial notes are made, the proposed
findings that follow are merely a cleamng up and edit of those trial notes This certainly did not
necessarily require near 9 hours to edit trial notes
Moreover, there should not be any recovery for time spent by any paralegals, as these are
not attorney's fees, nor should there be any costs which are not taxable under Utah law, such as
copying expenses It is noteworthy that this Court directed m its Conclusions of Law that there
was to be an award of attorneys fees, however, the Plaintiffs seek not only attorneys fees but also
costs, some of which are not taxable costs
IV

Equity and Other Factors
The Court in its findings of fact found that Defendant should have communicated better

with its customers and employees Hov ever, the same rwo-way street existed for the Plaintiffs
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and how they reacted to this situation. Without re-arguing the case, it is noteworthy that
Plaintiffs threatened Defendant with a multi-million dollar litigation. This threat certainly was
not made as an effort to seek an amicable resolution. Moreover, after enlisting the assistance of
legal counsel, instead of trying to work out an agreement, litigation was initiated seeking
primarily the abuse of lien cause of action. Quickly, Plaintiffs' attorneys fees amounted to an
amount early on in the litigation which nearly exceed the actual total attorneys fees expended by
the Plaintiff through trial. This escalation of attorneys fees by Plaintiffs was the primary reason,
and perhaps the sole reason, the case was unable to be settled without a trial.
Additionally, Plaintiffs consistently maintained prior to litigation and throughout
litigation, that the countertop installed in the master bathroom was not, and could not be
categorized as, Juperiana Bordeaux. It was clearly explained that this stone was "Juperana
Bordeaux" but was not from the exact same slab as the kitchen countertop. Based upon this
continuously disputed issue by the Plaintiffs that this was not "Juperana Bordeaux", Plaintiff
incurred significant expense in bringing an out-of-state expert to examine the actual counter-tops
and provide an expert opinion which stated that the countertops were all "Juperana Bordeaux".
However, even after the expert had rendered this opinion, Plaintiffs remained steadfast in their
original contention that this was not that type of stone.
Plaintiff was then required to expend more money to bring this expert back on the date of
trial to provide the testimony that the stone was, in fact, Juperana Bordeaux. It was to the dismay
and surprise of Southwest Marble and its counsel, when, on the day of trial, it was learned and
disclosed for the very first time that the Plaintiffs agreed that the stone was, in fact, Juperana
Bordeaux. This wras a frustrating surprise to have this fact revealed after the start of trial. The
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expenditures for an expert witness were unnecessary and a complete detriment to Southwest
Marble.
The calculation of reasonable attorneys fees is in the sound discretion of this trial court
What is reasonable depends on a number of factors, the amount in controversy, the extent of
services rendered and other factors which the trial court is in an advantaged position to judge.
Pixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (1988) quoting Wallace v. Build, Inc, 402 P.2d 699
(1965)). The Utah Supreme Court enlarged the list of potential factors to include, but not limited
to, the relationship of the attorneys fees to the amount recovered, the novelty and difficulty of the
issues involved, the overall result achieved. (Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984)).
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has also added "the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency
of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the
case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the
case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. (Cabrera
v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1983)).
Under principles of reasonableness and equity, the unique circumstances of this case, and
consistent with the criteria prescribed by the Utah Supreme Court, the award of attorneys fees
should be significantly reduced. Defendant has been significantly impacted by this case already.
Defendant is out the costs of the countertops and labor for installation, $2,182.00, loss of profits,
its own attorneys fees and costs, and a money judgment for $1,565 in favor of the Plaintiffs.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs retain the value and use of these countertops at the cost and expense of
Southwest Marble. To saddle the Southwest Marble with five-figures of attorneys fees would not
be appropriate, inequitable and is inordinately disproportionate to the actual amount in
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controversy, nearl\ $30 000 00 in economic damages against Southwest Marble for a contractual
dispute over $2,182
Admittedly hindsight provides some insight and direction as to how this situation may
have been handled differently by both parties However, a hit of nearly $30,000 00 is not
reasonable under these circumstances There was not any malice, intentional conduct or other
cncumstances which were egregious Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this court review
this post-trial matter
Dated this 22nd day of April, 2008

Shawfr T JFjpiy
Attorney for Scpthwest Marble & Granite, Inc

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 22nd day of April, 2008, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was duly served
upon the Plamtiffs/Counter-Defendants by depositing a copy of the same m the US Mails,
postage pre-paid, first-class mail, and addressed as follows
Michael F Leavitt
Durham, Jones & Pinegar
192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St George, UT 84770

Employee of Farris & Utley, PC

